Recent times have witnessed the emergence of large-scale, web-based service marketplaces where many small service providers compete among themselves on catering to customers with diverse needs. Customers who frequent these marketplaces seek quick resolutions and thus usually trade-off prices with waiting times.
Introduction
Recent times have witnessed the emergence of large-scale, web-based service marketplaces where many small service providers (agents) compete among themselves on catering to customers with diverse needs. Customers who frequent these marketplaces seek quick resolutions for their temporary problems and thus usually trade-off prices with waiting times. These marketplaces are typically operated by an independent firm, which we shall refer to as the moderating firm. The moderating firm establishes the infrastructure for the interaction between customers and agents.
In particular, it provides the customers and the agents with the information required to make their decisions. These moderating firms vary with respect to their involvements in the marketplace.
They can introduce operational tools which specify how the customers and the agents are matched together. For instance, while some of the moderating firms allow the customers to choose a specific Large-scale Service Marketplaces service provider directly, others allow customers to post their needs and let service providers apply for the job. Moreover, moderating firms can introduce strategic tools which allow communication and collaboration among the agents. These different involvements result in different economic and operational systems, and thus vary in their level of efficiency, and the outcomes for both customers and service providers.
A typical example of such a marketplace is oDesk.com where around 250,000 programmers compete on providing software solutions. oDesk.com allows for two types of interaction between customers and service providers. Customers can go directly to a programmer and ask him to provide the service. The customers are then queued for this specific agent. In this type of interaction, most of the time is spent waiting for the agent to complete his previous jobs (36% of the waiting time is spent from the moment the customer chooses the agent until the agent begins working.
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). On the other hand, oDesk.com also allows customers to post jobs and wait while agents apply for the job. In this type of interaction, a negligible amount of time passes until more than 10 agents apply, leaving the decision at the hands of the customer. Another large-scale, online service marketplace is ServiceLive.com, which is a start-up owned by Sears Holding Company. ServiceLive.com (with the slogan of "your price, your time") caters to time and price-conscious customers and service providers in the home repair and improvement arena. ServiceLive.com allows customers to choose among multiple agents after naming their price and describing their project. This type of interaction between customers and service providers is equivalent to the second one described for oDesk.com.
Both oDesk.com and ServiceLive.com receive 10% of the price of the project at service completion.
In both marketplaces, the moderating firms allow the customers to browse among tens of thousands of agents and communicate with different providers to make the service transaction "one-clickaway."
Motivated by these online service marketplaces, we aim to study the moderating firm's role in the service marketplace where the objective of the individual players, customers as well as service providers, is to maximize their own utility. We distinguish between three degrees of involvements of moderating firms in such markets: (1) No-Intervention: the moderating firm restricts its involvement to providing the facility for agents to advertise their services, set their prices, and for suited for large games where single agent deviations are practically negligible. We refer to this new equilibrium concept as δ-Market Equilibrium.
5. The analysis in this paper allows us to develop a methodology that can be used to analyze more complex marketplaces with multiple customer classes and agents with multiple skill sets. Our results provide a rigorous justification of the underlying methodology in the setting of homogenous customers and agents.
Literature Review
The previous work related with our paper can be divided into two categories. The first category consists of research that studies the applications of queueing theory in service systems. The second one consists of research that aims at developing approximations to analyze complex service systems.
Service systems with customers, who are both price and time sensitive, have attracted the attention of researchers for many years. The analysis of such systems dates back to Naor's seminal work (See Naor, 1969) , which analysis customer behavior in a single-server queueing system. Motivated by his work, many researchers study the pricing problem of a monopoly facing price-and delaysensitive customers in various settings (See De Vany (1976) , Mendelson and Whang (1990) , Afeche and Mendelson (2004) ). Another body of research that is motivated by Naor (1969) considers the competition among service providers who make pricing and/or service capacity decisions. Luski (1976) and Levhari and Luski (1978) focus on the competition between two firms under markovian assumptions. Natural extensions of the competition models assume general service time distributions, observable queue lengths, many firms, and multiple customer classes (See Loch (1991), Li and Lee (1994) , and Lederer and Li (1997) ). We refer the reader to Hassin and Haviv (2003) for an extensive summary of the early attempts to model price and service competition. More recently, Cachon and Harker (2002) studies the competition between two firms offering substitute but differentiated services. The paper establishes sufficient conditions for the existence of the equilibrium, and characterizes the equilibrium behavior of the competing firms. Furthermore, it shows that firms can reattain their foregone profits due to the competition by outsourcing their production even if outsourcing does not bring any cost benefits. In another differentiated services setting, Allon and Federgruen (2007) considers the price and waiting time as completely independent firm attributes by employing a general demand model rather than a full-price model as in the previ-Large-scale Service Marketplaces ous papers. In this paper, authors study the competition between single-server queueing systems (under markovian assumptions) in which the price and service level are determined sequentially or simultaneously. In Allon and Federgruen (2008) , they relax the markovian assumptions. Most of the above papers model the customer behavior implicitly via an exogenously given demand function. An alternative approach is followed in Chen and Wan (2003) where authors examine the customers' choice problem explicitly by embedding it into the firms' pricing problem. Other notable examples focusing on the customers' demand decision in competition models are Ha et al. (2003), and Cachon and Zhang (2007) .
The pricing and the capacity planning problem of the service systems can easily become analytically intractable when trying to study more complex models, such as a multi-server queueing systems. Recognizing this difficulty, many researchers seek robust and accurate approximations to analyze multi-server queues. Halfin and Whitt (1981) is the first paper that proposes and analyzes a multi-server framework. This framework is aimed at developing approximations, which are asymptotically correct, for multi-server systems. It has been applied by many researchers to study the pricing and service design problem of a monopoly in more realistic and detailed settings. Maglaras and Zeevi (2003) , Armony and Maglaras (2004) , and Maglaras and Zeevi (2005) are the examples of recent work using the asymptotic analysis to tackle complexity of these problems.
An important phenomena in service systems is that customers abandon while waiting for their service to commence. This behavior of customers may have a non-trivial impact on the system under consideration. Furthermore, ignoring the possibility of abandonment may cause misleading operational conclusions such as overstaffing in call-centers. To address these issues, Garnett et al. (2002) extends the asymptotic analysis of multi-server queueing system by considering a markovian system (exponentially distributed arrival, service, and abandonment times). Zeltyn and Mandelbaum (2005) provides approximations for the systems with generally distributed abandonment times. Furthermore, Whitt (2006) introduces fluid approximations for these systems relaxing markovian assumptions.
Most of the papers that use approximation methods aim to provide prescriptions for a single firm maximizing its profits. However, the idea of using approximation methods can also be applied to characterize the equilibrium behavior of the firms in a competitive environment. To our knowledge, Allon and Gurvich (2008) is the first paper studying competition among complex queueing systems via using asymptotic analysis to approximate the queueing dynamics. They do not only characterize the equilibrium in a market consisting of large-scale service providers but also introduce a framework to analyze such games by combining game theoretic foundations and asymptotic analysis of queueing systems. Another recent paper studying the equilibrium characterization of a competitive marketplace using asymptotic analysis is Chen et al. (2008) . They consider a marketplace with multiple suppliers competing with each other on their prices and target lead times.
They show that the first best solution can be induced in the market via a compensation scheme which rewards idle servers. There are two main differences between these two papers and our work.
First, both of them study a service environment with a fixed number of decision makers (firms) while the number of decision makers in our marketplace (agents) is growing. Second, they only consider a competitive environment where the firms behave individually. In contrast, we study the non-cooperative case as well as the case where the agents have a limited level of collaboration.
In the field of operations management (OM), the majority of the papers employing gametheoretic foundations study non-cooperative settings. For an excellent survey, we refer to Cachon and Netessine (2004) . There is also a growing literature that studies the OM problems in the context of cooperative game theory. Nagarajan and Sosic (2008) provide an extensive summary of the applications of cooperative game theory in supply chain management. Notable examples are the formation of coalitions among retailers to share their inventories, suppliers, and marketing powers (See Granot and Sosic (2005) , Sosic (2006) , and Nagarajan and Sosic (2007) ). This body of research is related with our work, where we look for the limited collaboration among agents.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: §3 introduces a basic model of the marketplace under consideration. We introduce and analyze the no-intervention, the operational efficiency, and the communication enabled models in §4, §5, and §6, respectively. In §7, we turn our attention to the moderating firm, and discuss the impact of the various degrees of its involvement in the marketplace on its own profit. Finally, §8 summarizes our major results. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Model Formulation
Consider a service marketplace where agents and customers make their decisions in order to maximize their individual utilities. Customers arrive according to a Poisson process with rate Λ. Upon Large-scale Service Marketplaces arrival to the marketplace, a customer decides whether to join the system or leave immediately.
If she leaves the system immediately, her utility is zero. If she joins the system, she decides who would process her job. The exact nature of this decision depends on the specific structure of the marketplace decided upfront by the moderating firm. We shall elaborate on the choices of customers in Sections 4-6. When the service of a customer is successfully completed, she pays the price of the service, earns a reward of R, and incurs a waiting cost of c per unit time until her service commences. Throughout the paper we assume c < R because if R < c, customers will not be interested in requesting service from the marketplace. As the customers visiting the marketplace seek temporary help, a customer joining the system may become impatient while waiting for her service to start, and abandon the system without getting the service. In this case, the abandoning customer does not pay any price or earn any reward but she incurs a waiting cost for the time she spends in the system. We assume that customers' abandonment times are independent of all other stochastic components and are exponentially distributed with mean m a . Customers decide whether to request service or not and by whom to be served according to their expected utility.
The expected utility of a customer is based on the reward, the price and the anticipated waiting time.
The above summarizes the demand arriving to the marketplace. Next, we discuss the capacity provision in the marketplace. There are k ex-ante identical agents. Note that in oDesk.com, even if one restricts itself to a specific skill, a specific quality, and a specific location, the number of service provider is typically large. For instance, there are around 500 web-designer with five-star rating located in North America. We assume that service time required to satisfy the requests of a given customer is exponentially distributed with rate µ. Without loss of generality, we let µ = 1.
The only decision of an agent is to choose a price for his service; each agent makes this decision independently. Let (p 1 , . . . , p k ) denote the resulting price vector with p n being the price chosen by the n th agent. We normalized the operating cost of the agents to zero without loss of generality.
The expected revenue of an agent depends on the price he chose and his demand volume.
We refer to the ratio Λ/k as the demand-supply ratio of the system and denote it by ρ > 0. The demand-supply ratio is a first order measure for the mismatch between aggregate demand and the total processing capacity. Marketplaces vary with respect to their demand-supply ratio and, as we shall discuss, the level of demand-supply ratio has a significant impact on the market outcome. We broadly categorize marketplaces into two: Buyer's market where ρ ≤ 1, and seller's market where
The reader will notice that the above description of the model, though specifying demand (customer arrivals) and capacity (agents), lacks the characterization of their interaction. As mentioned before, their interaction would depend on the "rules" which the moderating firm puts in place when creating the marketplace. We shall provide a detailed description of these rules in the following sections. In Section 4, we study the market in which the moderating firm does not intervene in the marketplace at all, and only plays the role of information provider. In Section 5, the moderating firm modify the interaction between customers and agents to allow for efficient operational matching. Apart from this efficient matching, the moderating firm provide infrastructure for the agents to communicate with each other in Section 6. The analysis is culminated in Section 7 where we systematically compare the impact of the use of different tools on the profit of the moderating firm which critically depends on the total revenue generated in the marketplace.
No-Intervention Model
The essential role of the moderating firm in a large scale marketplace is to set up the infrastructure for the interaction between players. This is crucial because all players have to be equipped with the necessary information such as prices and waiting times to make their decisions, yet individual players cannot gather this information on their own. When the moderating firm provides only the required information, it has no impact on the strategic interaction taking place in the marketplace.
We thus refer to such a setting as the no-intervention model. We analyze the dynamics of a largescale marketplace in the no-intervention model not only to derive insights about the behavior of the self-interested and competing players in such a system but also to build a benchmark for the proceeding cases in which the moderating firm introduces additional features which change the nature of the marketplace. Therefore, in this section, we study the behavior of a marketplace where the moderating firm confines itself to aggregating and providing information.
We model the strategic interaction between the agents and the customers as a sequential move game. Given the setup of Section 3, along with the above mentioned role of the moderating firm, the agents first announce their prices. Each arriving customer observes these prices and decides whether to request service or not. Further, if a customer decides to join the system, she also chooses Large-scale Service Marketplaces the agent who processes her service request. The service of a customer starts immediately if the agent she chooses is available. Otherwise, she joins the queue in front the agent and waits until her service to commence. We denote the fraction of customers choosing agent-n by D n . Then, ΛD n is the demand volume for agent-n.
More specifically, each agent's operations can be modeled as an M/M/1 + M queueing system where the arrival rate of customers depends on the strategies of customers and agents
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. If the rate of customers who request service from an agent charging price p is λ, the utility of a customer requesting service from this agent is
, where β(λ), which will be referred to as the abandonment function, is the probability of abandonment, and W (λ) is the expected waiting time, in an M/M/1 + M system with arrival rate λ, service rate 1, and abandonment rate 1/m a . Using queueing theory, the utility of customers can be rewritten as
It is important to note that V (λ, p) is the revenue rate of an agent, but throughout the paper we will refer to it as the revenue for ease of exposition.
As we consider a sequential move game, we are interested in the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE) of the game. We begin by characterizing the equilibrium in the second stage game where customers make their service requests given the agents' pricing decisions. Then, based on the second stage equilibrium, we derive the equilibrium of the first stage in which only agents make pricing decisions.
Fixing the agents' strategies (p n ) k n=1 , an arriving customer observes the agents' prices and chooses the agent who maximizes her utility, anticipating the behavior of all other customers. Therefore, in equilibrium a customer chooses an agent only if the utility she obtains from him (weakly) dominates her utility from any other agent. This is also known as "Nash Flow Equilibrium" (See Roughgarden, 2005) in the congestion games literature. We formally define the Customer Equilibrium as follows:
is a Customers Equilibrium if the following conditions are satisfied:
The first condition of the Customer Equilibrium requires that customers request service from an agent in equilibrium only if that agent is one of their best alternatives. Moreover, the second condition ensures that customers do not leave the system immediately if it is possible to earn strictly positive utility by requesting service from an agent. In the following proposition, we show that for any given price vector, the second stage game has a unique equilibrium.
, there is a unique Customer Equilibrium.
Since the Customer Equilibrium is unique for any given price vector, we denote the fraction of customers requesting service from agent-n in equilibrium by
is well defined in the light of Proposition 1. We can now move to the first stage game which is played only among the agents. An equilibrium in this stage requires that none of the agents can improve his revenues by deviating unilaterally while taking the customers' response into account. We formalize this in the following definition:
is a SPNE if the following conditions are satisfied:
The first condition requires that (D n ) k n=1 arises in equilibrium in the second stage game. The second condition states that none of the agents has incentive to change his price. Note that agents take into account the impact price changes have on the Customer Equilibrium, and thus on demand.
Characterization of SPNE
In this section, we restrict attention to symmetric SPNE where all agents charge the same price p in the first stage. This is a natural choice since all agents are identical. Non-symmetric equilibria will be discussed in Section 6.
A price p emerges in equilibrium in the first stage if a single agent chooses to charge p to maximize his revenues given that all other agents announce p. When all other k − 1 agents announce p, a generic agent, say agent-, solves the following maximization problem to determine his bestresponse:
In this problem, the objective function is the utility of agent-when he charges p and the 
, and λ 0 is the unique solution to
Similar to Theorems 1-3 in Chen and Wan (2003), the above result suggests that agents behave as local monopoly and charge their monopoly prices when the arrival rate is sufficiently high.
Moreover, in this case, agents may choose not to cover the market completely. However, once the arrival rate becomes less than λ 0 , the equilibrium price will be pushed down as the agents are engaged in a cut-throat competition, allowing customers to earn strictly positive utility in the equilibrium.
Remark 1. Concavity of the abandonment function, β(λ), is a sufficient condition for the existence of symmetric equilibrium. In Lemma 1 in the Appendix, we show that β(λ) is concave when m a ≤ 1. Furthermore, conducting a numerical study, we observe that β(λ) is concave even for 1 ≤ m a ≤ 2. However, for higher values of m a , the function β(λ) is not concave in λ. Even though β(λ) is not concave, there can be a symmetric SPNE and the above theorem characterizes a unique candidate for the symmetric equilibrium. Numerically, we see that the equilibrium candidate characterized above still emerges in the symmetric SPNE when β(λ) is not concave.
Operational Efficiency Model
In the previous section, we characterized the market outcome in the absence of any intervention on the part of the moderating firm. We now turn to discuss the impact of different mechanisms used by the moderating firm. As we discussed in the introduction, the moderating firm may provide a mechanism which improves the operational efficiency of the whole system by efficiently matching customers and agents. This mechanism aims at reducing inefficiency due to the possibility of having a customer waiting in line for a busy agent while an agent who can serve her is idle. This efficiency improvement is equivalent to virtually grouping the agents charging the same price. For instance, oDesk.com achieves this goal by allowing customers to post their needs and service providers to apply to these postings. When a customer posts a price on oDesk.com, agents, which are willing to serve a customer for that price, apply to the customer's posting, and among these the customer will favor agents based on their immediate availability.
In this section, we modify the service marketplace considered in Section 4 by assuming that the mechanism introduced by the moderating firm ensures that customers do not stay in line when there is an idle agent willing to serve them by charging the price they want to pay. This can be modeled as a multi-server queue where the number of servers is the number of agents willing to charge the price of the customers. As the agents announcing the same price are virtually grouped together, it is not necessary to keep track of the price announced by each individual agent. Once each agent announces a price per customer to be served, we can construct a resulting price vector
where N ≤ k is the number of different prices announced by the agents. We refer to the agents announcing the price p n as sub-pool-n and denote the number of agents in the sub-pool-n by y n . Hence, (p n , y n ) N n=1 summarizes the strategy of all agents. Under this mechanism, we model the customer decision making and experience as follows: If there are different prices announced by the agents, i.e. N > 1, the customer chooses a sub-pool from which she requests the service. Each customer who decides to join the system enters the service immediately if there is an available agent in the sub-pool she chooses. Otherwise, she joins the queue in front of the agent sub-pool and waits in that queue until one of the agents in the sub-pool becomes available. We denote the fraction of customers requesting service from sub-pool-n by D n .
As we mentioned before, the operations of each sub-pool consisting of y agents is modeled as a multi-server queueing system where the arrival rate of customers depends on the strategies of customers and agents. Therefore, when the rate of customers who request service from a sub-pool with y > 0 agents charging the price p is λ, the utility of a customer requesting service from this sub-pool is given by U (λ, p, y) 
where β(λ, y) is the probability
The strategic interaction between the agents and the customers is modeled, as before, as a sequential move game. However, we use a slightly different second stage equilibrium than the one in Definition 1 since the customers decision and utility is changed by the new mechanism. The new customer equilibrium, which we refer to as Market Customer Equilibrium, uses the concept of Nash Flow Equilibrium with the requirement that customers only care for the prices announced by the sub-pools instead of individual prices.
is a Market Customers Equilibrium if the following conditions are satisfied:
Similar to Proposition 1, one can establish the uniqueness of the Market Customer Equilibrium for any given (p n , y n ) N n=1 . Furthermore, we denote the fraction of customers requesting service from sub-pool-n by D
is a tuple of two vectors whose components are the prices and the number of agents announcing them.
In the first stage of the game, agents make pricing decisions. Unlike the no-intervention model, we need to account for two types of deviations in this case when considering unilateral deviations of agents: An agents can either choose to deviate by joining an existing sub-pool or announce a new price. Therefore, an equilibrium in the first stage should be immune to any of these two deviations as formally stated in the following definition.
summarize the strategy of all players in the market with
is a Market Equilibrium if the following conditions are satisfied:
For any ≤ N and m ≤ N , we have that
where
The first condition in the above definition requires that the vector (D n ) N n=1 forms an equilibrium among the customers if the agents choose the strategy (p n , y n ) N n=1 . The second and third conditions characterize the equilibrium in the first stage game: The second condition states that agents have no incentive to join an existing sub-pool, while the third conditions states that an agent has no incentive to introduce a new sub-pool. We next turn to characterize the equilibrium in the marketplace.
Characterization of the Market Equilibrium
While these definitions are quite intuitive, the direct analysis of such markets can be quite complex for systems with a finite number of agents. Given that these marketplaces tends to be large, we shall approximate the system in a parametric regime where the demand and the number of agents are large. To this end, we consider a sequence of marketplaces indexed by the number of agents, i.e. there are k agents in the k th marketplace. The arrival rate in the k th marketplace is assumed to be Λ k = ρk for some ρ > 0. This ensures that the demand-supply ratio is constant along the sequence of marketplaces.
We next study the symmetric equilibrium for this sequence of marketplaces. As a first step towards characterizing the symmetric equilibrium, we derive the utility of agents when they announce the same price. The revenue of an agent when all agents charge p in the k th marketplace is given by
where D M CE 1 (p; k) is the Market Customer Equilibrium when all k agents charge p.
In order to characterize a symmetric Market Equilibrium, we need to verify that a single agent does not have any incentive to deviate to a price other than p. Recall that if an agent chooses p = p, this amounts to creating his own sub-pool consisting of only himself and his revenue is given 
Analyzing (2) directly is analytically intractable. To characterize the equilibrium price, our approach will be to approximate these revenue functions using their asymptotes. We first focus on the left hand side of (2) which is the revenue of agents when they charge the same price. We only need to consider the case p < R because none of the customers joins the system when all agents charge R, i.e. D
M CE 1
(R; k) = 0. While studying the left hand side, we distinguish between a buyer's and a seller's market. In a buyer's market where ρ ≤ 1, customers experience negligible waiting times if the number of agents is large, even if all of them request service. Thus, in a buyer's market, none of the customers leaves the system immediately in equilibrium since they obtain approximately the utility of R − p by joining. Furthermore, the revenue of each agent is approximated by pρ. In a seller's market where ρ > 1, it may still be true that all of the customers request service. In these cases, customers obtain a strictly positive utility despite incurring a waiting cost. However, once the aggregate demand is sufficiently high, some of the customers leave the market immediately due to the high congestion level. Regardless of how the customers behave in the equilibrium, the rate of customers requesting service in a seller's market should, in equilibrium, be more than the processing capacity. Otherwise, a customer joining the system would earn strictly positive utility while the customers who do not request service would obtain zero utility. Therefore, agents are always "over-utilized" in a seller's market and the revenue of each agent is approximately p. The following proposition presents these results formally. 
After approximating the revenue of the agents when they charge the same price, we now focus on the maximum revenue that an agents can obtain by creating its own sub-pool. The following proposition establishes an upper bound on the asymptotic revenue which a single agent can generate by deviating.
where ∆(p) = max 0,
− cm a , and λ
As long as the number of agents is large, deviation of a single agent does not have a significant impact on the demand for the remaining agents charging p since a single agent can only serve a negligible amount of customers relative to the aggregate demand. Therefore, the demand for the sub-pool consisting of k − 1 agents is almost the same as their "original" demand before deviation.
Note that ∆(p), as defined in Proposition 3, denotes the utility that the customers obtains in the Market Customer Equilibrium when all agents charge p. Then, to approximate the maximum post-deviation revenue, one can treat the deviating agent as a monopoly whose customers have an outside option with the value of ∆(p). In fact, the above proposition shows that this approximation constitutes an upper bound on the agent's post-deviation revenue.
Combining the two observations above, it is clear that in a large marketplace, a price p emerges as the symmetric Market Equilibrium outcome if p min{ρ, 1} is greater than the profit of a monopoly serving customers with outside option ∆(p). We state that result in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let The above theorem characterizes the set of symmetric Market Equilibrium for large marketplaces.
The theorem does not guarantee the uniqueness of such an equilibrium, i.e. P(ρ) may not be a singleton. In fact, P(ρ) may consists of uncountably many prices. For illustrative purposes, we consider the case where the abandonment rate is equal to the service rate. The next corollary characterizes the correspondence P(ρ) as well as the asymptotic behavior of the unique equilibrium price under the no-intervention model, which will aid us in discussing the benefit (or lack thereof) of introducing operational efficiency. The prices that form a symmetric market equilibrium as a function of the demand-supply mismatch (ρ). The service rates and abandonment rates are assumed to be one. . We observe that for all positive ρ, the set P(ρ) is not a singleton. In fact, for all ρ > 0, we have a wide range of prices that can form an equilibrium. Furthermore, many of the possible equilibrium prices in P(ρ) are lower than p N I
lim
. The intuition behind this result is the following: In a marketplace where the moderating firm efficiently matches customers and agents, a single agent, who deviates by introducing a new price, loses benefits of efficient matching, and thus cannot sustain the same quality of service (in terms of waiting times) as his "original" pool.
It turns out that the deviating agents cannot improve his "original" revenue by either increasing or decreasing his price. Thus, the price-generated pool serves as a deterrent against single agent deviations even if prices are unappealing from a system point of view. These lower prices lead to loss in total revenue for the marketplace. While one may expect operational efficiency tools to be a leverage for higher revenues in the market, it is surprising to see that reducing the unnecessary waiting and idleness present in a system with no intervention may deteriorate the revenues.
Comparing the equilibrium prices in a market with operational efficiency with the prices in a market with no intervention, one should also observe that operational efficiency does not only serve as a deterrent for deviations from low prices but also prevents deviations from high prices for any level of demand-supply ratio. Moreover, when the aggregate demand is sufficiently high, efficient matching always leads to higher profits although the equilibrium prices under operational efficiency may be slightly lower than the unique equilibrium in a market without operational efficiency.
Communication Enabled Model
In this section, we continue to study the impact of different mechanisms used by the moderating firm. As we mentioned in the introduction, the moderating firm may complement its operational tool discussed in the previous section with a strategic tool which changes the nature of the interaction among agents. In a marketplace such as oDesk.com, service providers are offered discussion boards in which they are allowed to exchange information. Moreover, the market supports the creation of affiliation groups which are self-enforcing entities. We will thus focus on the impact of enabling communication among agents on the market outcome.
The economics literature suggests that when the players have the opportunity to perform nonbinding pre-play communication among themselves, the stability of an outcome can be threatened by potential deviations formed by coalitions, even in noncooperative games. Following this idea, the well-know notion of Strong Nash Equilibrium (SNE ) requires stability against deviations formed by any conceivable coalitions (See Aumann (1959) ). The main drawback of SNE is that many of the games do not have any SNE. In order to solve the non-existence problem, Bernheim et al.
(1987) introduce the notion of Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium (CPNE ) as a refinement for the Nash Equilibrium concept. CPNE requires stability against only the deviations which are stable.
In this section, we modify the marketplace we study in the previous section by assuming that agents have opportunities to make non-binding communication prior to making their decisions, so that they can try to self-coordinate their actions in a mutually beneficial way despite the fact that each agent selfishly maximizes his own utility.
Echoing the ideas in the economics literature, allowing communication among agents changes the equilibrium concept we use to characterize the outcome in the marketplace. We model this by proposing a new equilibrium concept which allows several agents to deviate together. More specifically, the new concept requires that a strategy of agents should be immune to any coalitions.
Since a marketplace tends to be large (e.g. there are hundreds of thousands of agents in oDesk.com) one has to restrict the possible size of a coalition. We denote the largest fraction of agents that is allowed to deviate together by 1/k < δ < 1. We refer to our equilibrium concept as δ-Market
Equilibrium which is defined as follows:
summarize the strategy of all players in the market. Then, (D n , p n , y n ) N n=1 is a δ-Market Equilibrium if the following conditions are satisfied. 
3. For any ≤ N , 0 < d ≤ min{y , δk }, and p = p n for all n = 1, . . . , N , we have that
The above definition is closely related to the definition of Market Equilibrium in Section 5. The key difference between these two equilibrium definitions is that δ-Market Equilibrium allows more than one agent to deviate together by either forming a new sub-pool or joining an existing one.
In fact, our new equilibrium concept is a refinement of the Market Equilibrium. Therefore, any δ-Market Equilibrium is also a Market Equilibrium. Employing the δ-Market Equilibrium concept, we expect that the set of prices that can be sustained as a Market Equilibrium will shrink since δ-Market Equilibrium is more restrictive. Kalai (2004) and Gradwohl and Reingold (2008) study large games and shows that all of the Nash Equilibria of certain large games is resilient to deviations by coalitions. While their result may seem against our expectations, we will show that such a phenomena does not exists in our model. 
Fluid Approximation
Even though we have a refinement of the Market Equilibrium, it is still very complicated to derive the equilibrium for a marketplace with a finite number of agents directly. Therefore, as in Section 5.1, we would like to study δ-Market Equilibrium as the market size grows. To this end, we shall consider the sequence of marketplaces described before. Recall that there are k agents in the k th marketplace, and the arrival rate is Λ k = ρk for some ρ > 0. Before characterizing the behavior of the equilibrium along the sequence of marketplaces, we begin by describing the limiting game formally. In Section 6.3, we show that any sequence of δ-Market Equilibrium converges to the equilibrium characterized in the limiting game as the market size grows. It is important to note that analysis of the limiting game provides insightful results to characterize the equilibrium of a finite system since deviation of the agents are well approximated by the asymptote when we employ δ-Market Equilibrium. This is in contrast to the case of Market Equilibrium where we could not characterize the equilibrium by considering the limiting game because single agent deviation would be lost.
To describe our limiting game, we assume that the number of agents k goes to infinity, and we consider our original model defined in the previous section as a fluid model. The benefit of using a fluid model is that it provides an accurate yet simple approximation for the abandonment function β(λ, k), which helps us to derive the utility of the customers and agents in simple form.
In particular, Whitt (2006) shows that in large systems, the abandonment function β(λ, k) in an M/M/k + M system with arrival rate λ, service rate 1, and abandonment rate 1/m a can be approximated as follows.
3 According to the definition in Gradwohl and Reingold (2008) , a Nash Equilibrium is resilient to coalitions if players cannot improve their revenues "too much" even after a coordinated deviation. In our setting, "too much" has to be almost three times as much as the customer reward, R, in order to apply their results to our game. Clearly, this makes the definition of resilience vacuous because none of the agent can increase his revenue by more than R.
Large-scale Service Marketplaces
As we discuss in the model with finite number of agents, we can summarize the strategy of all agents by (p n , y n ) N n=1 where y n is the fraction of the agents in sub-pool-n. We use the measure density ν on the set of positive integers I introduced by Buck (1946) to denote the fraction of the agents in a given sub-pool.
Recall that price-generated sub-pools operates as multi-server queues in the original model. Therefore, in the limiting game, we can replace each sub-pool of agents charging the same price by a fluid model where the arrival and service rates depend on the strategies of customers and agents. If the rate of customers who request service from a sub-pool, which includes y fraction of agents charging the price p, is λ, we can write the utility of a customer requesting service from this sub-pool as
using Whitt's result. Similarly, the revenue of the agents in that sub-pool is
Similar to the previous models, we first give the definition of the customer equilibrium given the
is a Fluid Customers Equilibrium (FCE) if the following conditions are satisfied

For any n with
The above equilibrium definition is equivalent to Definition 3 where the second condition essentially breaks ties for a customer who is indifferent between joining the system and leaving immediately in favor of joining. As before, one can show that there is a unique Fluid Customer Equilibrium. Then, we denote the fraction of customers requesting service from sub-pool-n by
is a tuple of two vectors whose components are the prices and the fraction of agents announcing them.
In our fluid approximation, we do not change the structure of the game. Therefore, the δ-Market Equilibrium can still be used as the solution concept in the approximated model after a slight modification. For the sake of completeness, we present the definition of the equilibrium concept, which we refer to as Fluid Market Equilibrium, formally as follows:
summarize the strategy of all players in the market. Then, (D n , p n , y n ) N n=1 is a δ-Fluid Market Equilibrium (δ-FME) if the following conditions are satisfied.
, where
is a Fluid Market Equilibrium (FME) if it is a δ-FME for some δ ∈ (0, 1).
Characterization of Fluid Market Equilibrium
Similar to Section 5, we are interested only in the symmetric FME where all agents charge the same price. We start by deriving the utility of agents when all of them charge the same price p, 
Large-scale Service Marketplaces
One may notice that the customer equilibrium and the agent revenues shown above are the same as the limits in Proposition 2. The connection between these two results is that Proposition 2 described the limit of the equilibrium of the second stage and the resulting agent revenues, whereas this proposition describes the equilibrium of the second stage in the limiting game. In that respect, these two propositions provide a strong evidence for the applicability of the fluid approximation to characterize the equilibrium outcome.
In a seller's market, i.e. when ρ > 1, the rate of customers requesting service will exceed the processing capacity of agents in the market if all agents charge a price lower than R by Proposition 4.
Then, there is always room for a small group of agents to increase their prices while ensuring that they are still over-utilized after the price increase. Since this small group of agents increases their prices without hurting their utilization, this deviation clearly improves their revenues. Hence, when ρ > 1, any price lower than R cannot emerge as an equilibrium in the fluid model. Thus, in a seller's market the only candidate for the price that emerges in the equilibrium is R. On the other hand, in a buyer's market, i.e. when ρ ≤ 1, agents cannot be over utilized regardless of their prices, but they can attract more demand by cutting their prices, even if this price cut is very small. In fact, this price cut improves agents' revenues as long as ρ < 1. Therefore, in a buyer's market with ρ < 1, agents will not agree on any price in equilibrium that is higher than their operating costs. However, when ρ = 1, any deviation following a price cut decreases agents' revenue since agents are already fully utilized before they change their prices. It turns out, even a price increase can not improve the revenues of the agents when ρ = 1. Thus, in a buyer's market with ρ < 1, the only candidate for the price that emerges in the equilibrium is the operating cost whereas any price between the operating cost and R can be an equilibrium price when ρ = 1.
The following result establishes that, indeed, the equilibrium candidates discussed above emerge as the equilibrium price.
) be a symmetric F M E. We have that
The above result shows that agents can only charge their operational costs as a result of the competition in a buyer's market with ρ < 1 whereas they can sustain a price, which extracts all of the customer surplus, as the equilibrium outcome in a seller's market. Moreover, it also implies that the marketplace cannot be congested in the equilibrium even in a seller's market since any level of congestion can be capitalized by agents through a price increase.
Theorem 3 characterizes the unique symmetric FME, but this result can be extended by showing that the above equilibrium is indeed the unique FME when ρ = 1. We omit the formal presentation and instead provide the intuition of the result. The key driver of not having any equilibrium in which agents charge different prices is the possibility of capitalizing the congestion in the system.
Let's assume there is an asymmetric equilibrium in which agents charge different prices. First, we want to note that none of the sub-pool of agents can be congested in equilibrium, because otherwise a small group of agents from the sub-pool that is congested could improve their revenues by increasing their prices. Further, if all of the sub-pools are under-utilized, customers strictly prefer the one charging the lowest price because they only take into account the price they pay in the absence of congestion. Since the revenue of the agents in the sub-pool charging the lowest price is strictly positive whereas the agents in the other sub-pools earn no revenue, supposed asymmetric equilibrium is contradicting with the definition of FME.
Symmetric δ-Market Equilibrium
In the preceding subsection, we study the fluid approximation of our original model and characterize the market equilibrium in the limiting game. In this section, we show that for any sequence of equilibrium for the markets described in Section 6.1, the emerging prices converge to those described in Theorem 3 for the fluid model. Formally, we present this in the following theorem. It is worth noting that more complex systems that have non-homogenous customers as well as agents can be analyzed using the fluid approximation described in Section 6.2. This mode of analysis provides one with the approximate equilibria for large marketplaces. Allon et al. (2009) we appeal to the exact expressions in Zeltyn and Mandelbaum (2005) 
As it can be seen in Figure 2 , the set of prices that can be sustained as δ-Market Equilibrium shrinks as the number of agents increases for any given δ. Consistent with Theorem 4, we also observe that the equilibrium prices converge to the reward of the customers in a seller's market, The set of prices that form a symmetric δ-Market Equilibrium in the marketplace with k agents is the area above (below) the corresponding curve when Λ/k = 1.2 (Λ/k = 0.8).
The Moderating Firm
In Sections 4-6, we studied how different actions the moderating firm takes impact the outcomes of the marketplace for customers and agents. As discussed before, moderating firms such as oDesk.com and ServiceLive.com have operational and strategic tools to alter the interaction between customers and agents as well as among the agents. In this section, we move our attention to study the impact of these actions on the profit made by the moderating firm.
The ultimate objective of the moderating firm is to maximize its profit. Recall that the profit of the moderating firm is a share of the agents' revenue. Since different types of involvement of the moderating firm result in different equilibrium prices and customer demand, the moderating firm aims to intervene in the marketplace in order to make sure that the "right" prices and customer demand emerge in equilibrium. In a given marketplace, the total revenue of the agents cannot exceed min{Λ, k}R since they cannot charge more than R, and their effective demand is the minimum of their processing capacity and the aggregate demand. Therefore, the moderating firm's profit cannot exceed min{Λ, k}R in such a marketplace. We denote that natural bound for the moderating firm's
As we see in our analysis and in the above bound on the profit of the moderating firm, the results critically depend on whether the market is a seller's market, i.e. Λ > k, or a buyer's market, i.e.
Λ ≤ k. Therefore, we study the impact of different tools used by the moderating firm on its profit considering different market condition.
Sellers Market: In Section 6, we show that for a market with a large enough number of agents, when the firm ensures efficient operational matching and enables agent communication, the equilibrium prices approach R as well as the revenue of an agent at the marketplace. Thus,
is asymptotically achievable when the moderating firm uses operational and strategic tools together. In other words, the profit of the moderating firm from each agent is approximately R in large marketplaces. Since the moderating firm can achieve the highest possible profit by providing efficient matching and communication, under these market conditions using these two tools together dominates any other strategy from the moderating firm's point of view.
4 One can imagine a marketplace where the outside option of the agents, say V 0 , is positive. In this case, the moderating firm would restrict itself to min{Λ, k}R − V 0 and the rest of the analysis will follow the same lines. Note that in this case, the fraction of revenue the moderating firm can take from each agent would be
Buyers Market: Using operational and strategic tools together in a buyer's market, does not achieve desirable outcomes: As we discuss in the previous section, coupling efficient matching with agent communication leads to almost zero combined revenue for the agents and the moderating firm. Therefore, combining operational and strategic tools at the same time is not advisable in a buyer's market. However, the firm may still benefit by using efficient matching. We next compare the achievable benefit of using operational tools with the profit of the moderating firm in a market with no intervention. These profits will also be compared toΠ k (Λ, k) . To that end, we consider a sequence marketplaces as before: In the k th marketplace, there are k agents and the arrival rate is denoted by Λ k which is assumed to be ρk for some 0 < ρ ≤ 1. Furthermore, we restrict attention to the case where the abandonment rate is equal to the service rate for analytical tractability. 
is the maximum revenue that an agent may obtain in equilibrium in the k th marketplace when the moderating firm introduces operational efficiency. The next theorem provides analytical bounds on the benefits of using efficient matching in a buyer's market when compared both to the nointervention setting and the maximum achievable profit.
Theorem 5. Suppose the abandonment rate is equal to the service rate. Then, we have that
log (2) 0.45.
lim
≥ 1/4 for any 0 < ρ ≤ 1. Furthermore, this bound is tight in the neighborhood of
The first result in Theorem 5 shows that if a moderating firm does not intervene in the marketplace, i.e. it restricts itself providing information gathering infrastructure, it limits itself to at most 45% of the maximum achievable profits in a buyer's market. On the other hand, the second result states that the moderating firm can achieve a profit which is close to its maximum attainable one when it efficiently matches customers and agents in a marketplace with sufficiently high aggregate demand. Recall that operational efficiency suffers from multiplicity of equilibria, thus profit levels lower thanV OE k (ρ) are also possible for the moderating firm after introducing operational efficiency.
The last result in Theorem 5 establishes that even if the marketplace is under-loaded, efficient matching may allow the moderating firm to quadruple its profits compared to the no intervention case. It also shows that not intervening in the marketplace hurts the profits of the moderating firm most when the aggregate demand is low. Similar results may be obtained for the cases where customers are completely impatient (m a = 0) and completely patient (m a = ∞). When m a = 0, the moderating firm always quadruple its profit by efficient matching compared to the no intervention case while this is true for a range of demand-supply ratio, ρ, when m a = ∞ (See Ç il, cil2010 for more details).
There are also other possible ways for a moderating firm to be involved in the marketplace including contracting with the service providers as in the case of Liveops. This type of interaction between the moderating firm and the agents is outside the scope of this paper as it is not a market per-se anymore. In fact, such an arrangement is closer to a modern call center.
Conclusion
In this paper, we study a marketplace in which many small service providers compete with each other to provide service to self-interested customers looking for temporary help. The main focus of the paper is on the role of the moderating firm, which sets up the marketplace and creates the infrastructure where agents and customers interact. To this end, we explore the impact of the different strategies employed by the moderating firm. In particular, we distinguish between operational tools and strategic tools, and study the interplay between them in the way they alter the market outcome. In order to study the different strategies of the moderating firm, we consider three We characterize the market outcomes in each of these models. We observe that outcomes critically depend on market conditions broadly defined as a buyer's market in which aggregate demand is less than the capacity, and a seller's market in which aggregate demand exceeds the capacity. We show that when the moderating firm improves the operational efficiency of the system, this may result in profit loss for the firm and the agents, compared to their profits when the moderating Large-scale Service Marketplaces firm does not in intervene the marketplace. This result is somewhat counter-intuitive because the efficiency improvement due to better matching is not necessarily converted into additional profits.
We then show that when it is coupled with strategic tools in a seller's market, efficient matching allows the moderating firm to achieve its asymptotic optimal profit in a seller's market. However, using operational and strategic tools together in a buyer's market does not lead to the desirable outcomes and the firm is better off not intervening in the marketplace.
Both oDeck.com and ServiceLive.com are in their growth stage and have not achieved their full potential in terms of demand for their services as well as the attractiveness for service providers to provide their services on-line. However, both firms can and should project the steady state-"mature," market conditions, and decide on their appropriate measures to adopt. Given the moderate level of congestion in oDesk.com, one may infer that the marketplace can be identified as a seller's market. Following the discussion before, oDesk.com's decision to offer operational tools complemented with strategic tools is well justified. − (R + cm a ) < 0. Therefore, it is clear that λ 0 exists, it is unique, and λ 0 < kλ mon .
Necessary conditions for the symmetric equilibrium: The best response problem of agent-in (1) can be rewritten as follows: (p, . . . , p, p , p, . . . , p) and D − = D CE n (p, . . . , p, p , p, . . . , p) for any n = . We denote the solution to the above problem by (D (p), D − (p), p (p)) for a given p. Then, any symmetric SPNE (D, p) should satisfy the following FOC by the definition of the symmetric SPNE:
η 2 Λ(R − p + cm a )β (ΛD) − (k − 1)η 3 = 0,
where η 1 , η 2 , and η 3 are the Lagrangian multipliers of the constraints 1, 2, and 3 of the best response problem of agent-, respectively.
After some algebra using the above FOCs, any symmetric SPNE (D, p) should satisfy the following con- The proof is by contradiction, so that we suppose the result does not hold, i.e. ρλD 2 ≤ y. Then, by the definition of the customer utility function and the equilibrium conditions, we have that
Observe that the constraint on ε implies R − p − ε > U (ρD The proof is by contradiction, so that we suppose the result does not hold, i.e. ρλD 2 ≤ y. Then, we would have that D 1 = 0 since U (ρD 1 , p, 1 − y) = R − p < R − p + ε which implies that D 1 + D 2 ≤ y/ρ < 1. However, this contradicts with the definition of the Customer Equilibrium because U (ρD 2 , p + ε, y) = R − p + ε > 0.
Q.E.D.
Now, we are ready to prove Theorem 3. .
Observe that sup
p∈P(ρ) p = R for any 1 − log 1 +
